### 1AC

#### I was adrift that day.

That week, I found out that both my book tour and classes were canceled. With all my newly found time, I lived online, inhaling the fire hose of panic that also felt strangely ambient. In my newsfeed, I began to notice a troubling increase of anti-Asian incidents, which in the beginning was happening mostly abroad: A group of teenagers attacked a young Singaporean man in London, punching and kicking him while shouting about the coronavirus; an Italian bank denied service to a Chinese woman. Then in Texas, [a man stabbed and cut](https://www.cbs7.com/content/news/FIRST-ON-CBS7-Suspect-admitted-to-trying-to-kill-family-at-Midland-Sams-Club-affidavit-says-568837371.html)a Burmese-American family, including two young children, in an attack that the F.B.I. has called a hate crime.

On March 13, the Centers for Disease Control hadn’t yet recommended that everyone wear masks. Most of the people wearing them on the streets — in Chinatown but also all over the city — were Asian immigrants, who probably already knew that it was safer to wear a mask because you could be asymptomatic. But from a xenophobe’s perspective, the face mask seemed to implicate foreigners as agents of diseases. The masks depersonalized their faces, making the stereotypically “inscrutable” Asian face even more inscrutable, effacing even their age and gender, while also telegraphing that the Asian wearer was mute and therefore incapable of talking back if aggressed. I was afraid for the Chinese immigrants I encountered on the street. I wanted to take them aside and tell them it was safer not to wear one because the equipment that protected them — and others — only made them more vulnerable to attack.

I started bookmarking tweets and news reports of racist incidents. A sample:

[An Asian woman](https://twitter.com/RealElizabethHo/status/1238304263467446272) pressed an elevator button with her elbow. A man in the elevator asked, “Oh, coronavirus?” She said, “Don’t have it, but trying to be prepared.” As he was leaving the elevator, he said, “Don’t bring that Chink virus here.”

[An Asian woman](https://twitter.com/erinrose_mager/status/1237939575986716672) walked into a park and a group of mothers screamed for their kids to get away from her.

A middle-aged Asian woman wearing a mask was going for a walk when a woman screamed at her to get away from her.

[A man spat on an Asian man](https://nypost.com/2020/03/25/asian-man-spat-on-in-latest-coronavirus-hate-crime-in-brooklyn-station/) waiting for the subway.

[A man spat on an Asian woman](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/chinese-coronavirus-racist-attacks.html) walking to her gym.

[A woman refused a coffee](https://twitter.com/EugeneLeeYang/status/1238575560856498176) from a barista because she thought the barista was Chinese. When the Asian man behind her started telling her how irrational that request was, she snarled, “Are you Chinese?” He retorted, “No, but your ugly-ass knockoff purse is.”

**I never would**havethought that the word “Chink” would have a resurgence in 2020. The word was supposed to be as outdated as those sinister little Chinamen saltshakers I saw in thrift shops. It still thrived among bottom feeders on the internet, but I hadn’t heard it directed at me since I was in my 20s. But now I was encountering that word every time I read about an anti-Asian incident or hearing about its use from friends. I couldn’t process the fact that Americans were hurling that slur at us so openly and with such raw hate. In the past, I had a habit of minimizing anti-Asian racism because it had been drilled into me early on that racism against Asians didn’t exist. Anytime that I raised concerns about a racial comment, I was told that it wasn’t racial. Anytime I brought up an anti-Asian incident, a white person interjected that it was a distraction from the more important issue (and there was always a more important issue). I’ve been conditioned to think my second-class citizenry was low on the scale of oppression and therefore not worth bringing up even though every single Asian-American I know has stories of being emasculated, fetishized, humiliated, underpaid, fired or demoted because of our racial identities.

After President Trump called Covid-19 the “Chinese virus” in March, the Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council said more than 650 incidents of discrimination directed against Asian-Americans were reported to a website it helps maintain in one week alone. Even after seeing that number, I wondered if anti-Asian racism would be taken seriously. On Twitter, when the novelist R.O. Kwon talked about the surge, an in-law asked doubtfully, “Is it really happening?” Do the reports have to rise to 1,000 a week? 2,000? How many is enough so that the hate will be seen?

Since the coronavirus, what has been happening is a different strain of anti-Asian racism than the kind to which I’m accustomed. Not the kind in which we are invisible or we’re seen as efficient cyborgs. Racism never disappears but adapts to new circumstances when old strains rise from the dark vaults of American history. The recent rise carries the stench of late-19th-century xenophobia. In 1882, the government passed a federal law that banned Chinese laborers from entering the U.S. because of fears they were taking jobs away from whites. They were portrayed as a “degraded” race, a contagion that would stain the morals of white Americans. If black and indigenous people were systematically enslaved, killed and dispossessed of property, the Chinese were excluded from the U.S. altogether, an immigration ban that was essentially a form of global segregation. Chinese immigrants remaining in cities were segregated into squalid quarters. The scholar Joan B. Trauner writes that whites were repulsed by San Francisco’s Chinatown with “its foul and disgusting vapors” and health officials blamed the enclave for spreading every epidemic. One physician said at the time: “The Chinese were the focus of Caucasian animosities, and they were made responsible for mishaps in general. A destructive earthquake would probably be charged to their account.”

The anti-Chinese campaign was widespread, reaching less densely populated areas as well, where Chinese immigrants were afraid to leave their homes because they would be assaulted, even shot at. In 1885, in what is now Tacoma, Wash., white people terrorized the Chinese community by setting fire to their businesses. The xenophobia culminated in a riot in which a white mob drove 300 Chinese immigrants out of their homes. “Using clubs, poles and pistols,” writes the historian Beth Lew-Williams, the mob chased the weeping immigrants out of town in a freezing rain.

“I’m afraid to leave my home not because of coronavirus,” my Asian friends say, half in jest, “but because I don’t want to be a victim of a hate crime.” It doesn’t matter if our families hail from Thailand, Burma or the Philippines. Racism is indiscriminate, carpet bombing groups that bear the slightest resemblance to one another. We don’t have coronavirus. We are coronavirus.

On March 26, almost a week after Gov. Andrew Cuomo of New York ordered all nonessential businesses to close down and everyone to stay indoors, I wore a face mask to the grocery store. My husband had found a box of dust masks when he was cleaning out his studio. Headlines that day announced that the U.S. had the largest number of Covid-19 cases in the world, but the majority of Americans were still not wearing masks. I posted a picture of me wearing a mask on Instagram. “Wish me luck that I don’t get hate-crimed!” I wrote in the caption. My fears still felt performative, as if I didn’t have any right to them — as if I was overreacting — so I was compelled to make light of them.

But once outside, I was genuinely afraid, as if there were guards on the rooftops of South Brooklyn watching me through their sniper scopes. It is jarring to suddenly be so hypervisible. As an East Asian woman, I am more used to being overlooked and underestimated. I walked down our block and made a left on Bond Street, watching a man walk his dog coming my way, expecting him to make visible his fear, but he simply smiled as he walked around me.

The everyday racialized experience is not so much being the target of hate more than the anticipation of it. Will I be bullied because I’m Asian? Will he reject me because I’m Asian? Will they ignore me because I’m Asian? But it also happens when you least expect it. Once, when I was 13 and my sister was 8, we were walking out of a mall in Los Angeles as a white couple were walking in. I thought he was holding the door open for us so we scurried out. “I don’t open the doors for Chinks!” he yelled. Later that evening, I told my father of the incident. He looked both enraged and hurt. But instead of cursing that white man, he demanded that we should always “let them go first.” When I argued back, he said: “You can’t trust them. You don’t know what they’ll say. Always let them go first.”

I’ve told this story before. Every time I tell it, the vividness of the memory fades until it becomes an exhausted anecdote told to those who can only understand racism as a spectacle. Distrust, by the way, doesn’t result in insubordination. Growing up, my distrust of white people manifested itself in a physical unease in which I held my tongue or “let them go first.” It was a survival instinct, to curl myself in, so that there was no surface area vulnerable to insult. I grew out of that when I found my city and my community. I let my guard down. Maybe it was in my head, all along.

A teenage boy [kicked a 59-year-old Asian man](https://nypost.com/2020/03/11/asian-man-is-victim-in-latest-coronavirus-fueled-hate-crime/) in the back.

[A man chased an elderly Asian woman](https://nextshark.com/purell-man-chases-elderly-asian/) down the street with Purell.

[A woman](https://abc7ny.com/assault-hate-crime-bias-attack-coronavirus/6003396/)punched a young Asian woman in the subway, possibly dislocating her jaw.

The photo of the Burmese-American boy in the hospital was released. The stitches are deep and wide, from the back of his head to just below his eyebrow. He looked away from the camera, his eyes averted.

When a coronavirus-related racist incident happened to me, the perpetrator wasn’t white. Like many New Yorkers, I was jaywalking and nearly walked into a Latino deliveryman whizzing by on his bicycle. “Chinese bitch!” he shouted as he rode by. I wasn’t filled with hot rage or a hurt that cut me to the bone. I was just rattled and then sad.

To be Asian in America during the time of coronavirus is to feel very alone. You might think that everyone’s alone during the pandemic. But it’s a different form of isolation carved out by that insidious model-minority myth, with its implication that as long as you worked hard and didn’t ask for handouts, racial inequities could be overcome. Asian-Americans like Andrew Yang double down on the myth. In his recent Washington Post op-ed, he urged Asians to be more American: “Step up, help our neighbors, donate gear, vote, wear red, white and blue.” After 9/11, South Asian cabdrivers beribboned their cars with American flags, which did nothing to curb the Islamophobia. “During World War II, Japanese-Americans volunteered for military duty,” Yang wrote, “to demonstrate that they were Americans.” Japanese-American soldiers did enlist, helping free more than 30,000 survivors in Dachau, but their heroic acts abroad failed to liberate some of their own families from internment camps in this nation.

Asian-Americans have always lived a conditional existence in which belonging is promised as long as we work harder at being good, hamming up acts of courtesy when we help our neighbors, internalizing any racial slights we encounter and always allowing them to go first. The model-minority myth is a lie that silences the structural economic racism Asian-Americans have endured and the intergenerational traumas our families have experienced from years of Western colonialism, wars and invasions. I hated talking about the model-minority myth because it was like being stuck in a feedback loop. After refuting that myth, I was dragged back to refute it again. But when the pandemic struck, I realized how deeply entrenched that myth was in the psyches of not only whites but other people of color.

The coronavirus at least burned away any illusions that East Asians are almost white. Since the first cases were discovered in the U.S., I kept imagining the coronavirus as an irradiating purple light lancing through the cracks of our white-supremacist world. Some of us never noticed these cracks before, but now it is all that we can see. African-Americans and Latinos are dying in higher proportions than anyone else in New York City, perhaps because of their lack of access to health care and because many of them are essential workers and can’t shelter at home. But systemic racism keeps minorities separated. White supremacy ensures that once the pressure of persecution is lifted even a little from one group, that group will then fall upon the newly targeted group out of relief and out of a frustrated misplaced rage that can never touch, let alone topple, the real enemy.

The hate hasn’t abated since Americans have been ordered to stay indoors. The Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council said the reporting site was still receiving about 80 incidents a day, and there have been 1,600 since March 19. Because of the shelter-in-place rules, working-class Asians who are employed in essential businesses, like grocers, are not only at higher risk of being exposed to the virus but face the brunt of anti-Asian harassment. Yuh-Line Niou, a New York State assemblywoman who represents Chinatown and other areas in Lower Manhattan, said an Asian-American friend delivered food to a customer who spat right into his eye. Another friend, a nurse, was called a “dirty Chink” by her patient, who had Covid-19. “And these are the people who don’t report,” Niou said. “They’re scared of losing their jobs.”

Then on April 5, [an assailant tossed what’s believed to be acid](https://nypost.com/2020/04/06/brooklyn-woman-burned-outside-home-in-possible-acid-attack/)on a 39-year-old Asian woman in Brooklyn while she was taking out the trash, severely burning her head, neck and back. I am enraged. I am scared. In addition to fears of catching the virus or of being unemployed or of loved ones dying, we now have to worry about having acid thrown at us? It is happening everywhere. It is happening too close to home. It’s happening at home. One Asian-American family returned to their house in Minnesota and found a sign posted at their door: “We’re watching you,” the note said. “Take the Chinese virus back to China. We don’t want you here infecting us with your diseases.” It was signed, “Your friendly neighborhood.”

-Cathy Park Hong 20 (Recipient of the Windham-Campbell Prize, Guggenheim Fellowship and National Endowment for the Arts Fellowship, The Slur I Never Expected to Hear in 2020, April 26 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/magazine/asian-american-discrimination-coronavirus.html>)

#### This is a new age of Yellow Peril. Paranoia has been sutured to the social and political that ignites Asian violence to fuel American exceptionalism. This establishes a positive feedback loop that proliferates orientalist tropes that conflates Yellow Peril as the pathological death knell to Whiteness.

Svetlicic 20 (Marjan Svetlitic, PhD Professor Emeritus, Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, “From Red Scare to Yellow Peril; Reality and Fears of the Rise of China in a Historical Context,” Teorija in Praksa, Interdisciplinary Journal of Social Science, Vol. LVII, No. 1)

China appears to be the greatest challenge facing the world today. A strategic anxiety, the New China Scare, has surfaced. Such fears, almost rising to phobias, are not new. They have been seen regularly throughout history in various clothes whenever a power transition was underway. In more recent times, such fears started with the red scare, the fear of the rise of Bolshevism. This was followed by European fears of the USA becoming dominant in the period of reconstruction after WW2. Later, in the late 1950, following the spectacular technological rise of Japan, the Yellow Peril emerged in the USA for the second time. Today we are encountering the third Yellow Peril – even though it originally started already at the mid19th in the USA as a fear of Chinese immigrants. Following 9/11, the obsession with terrorism commenced similarly to earlier anti-communist hysteria in the country. The Trump Administration has now started a trade war with China as part of the inward-looking economic and nationalist policies of America First. An opportunity has been created to replace America’s presence in the global arena as a consequence. It is not by chance that a trade war is brewing at a time when China is celebrating 40 years of being open to the world and becoming a leader in certain technologies. What is really underway is a technology war. After China’s spectacular growth, it is now time for states to begin thinking about what this actually means to each of them, what it means to their region, and to the world generally. Trump’s trade war against China may be seen as a way of rectifying some of the deficiencies of the existing Pax Americana. It is thus high time to reflect on whether China’s growth threatens the world’s development and stability (system) or is benefiting the partner countries. The awareness that China is not only a country with a big economy, but also one that has growing military strength coupled with geo-strategic ambitions, is making a difference in both real life and theory2. World power is obviously going back to Asia. The winners will be those able to take advantage of this (Prestowitz, 2005). According to Porter, “the biggest risk is not that China will succeed in rising to become an economic superpower. The biggest risk is that it will fail” (Porter, 2005). It is hence no surprise that China is increasingly seen as a threat. Paranoia has been carved into mind-sets not only for the country’s size, but also for the different Chinese civilisation which for the Western world is a strange combination of culture, a particular type of state-controlled economy and state socialism/communism. The purpose of this article is therefore to answer two research questions. First, are these fears justifiable or overblown, with concerns being based on the differences in the roots of civilisation, on cultural fears? Second, what are these differences, if any at all, and can we detect any similarities among them? The article is structured as follows. We first look at the theoretical framework of such challenges/fears, then consider each fear in chronological order in sections 2 and 3. The fourth section seeks to identify differences/ similarities while the last sections outlines some policy-related conclusions. Theoretical Framework The article addresses the manner in which views/perceptions3 of different global challenges have evolved in recent history. Accordingly, the analysis concentrates more on qualitative data and attitudes along with the context in which they are created because, as implied by Kant’s “transcendental idealism”, it is appearances and perceptions, not the reality that truly matters. In such qualitative analysis, social psychology is becoming ever more important. It sees challenges as a positive reaction to perceived fear4, regarded as one of the basic emotions. “The culture of fear5 of the other seems to be a forceful mechanism of social and political indoctrination for human beings« (Skoll and Korstanje, 2013). It has played and continues to play a central role in driving popular fears to make the masses do, or not do, what the elite desires. Especially in the twenty-first century, described as uncertain and unpredictable, risky VUCA (vulnerability, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity), we seem to engage ever more frequently with various issues through a narrative of fear as a vital instrument of propaganda or, to borrow Bernays’ expression, engineering of consent (1969). People develop specific fears as a result of what they have learned, but the cause might also be an irrational, unconscious fear of the unknown6. Moreover, individual fears can grow into fears of a whole group or can as well arise from the fears held by a whole group usually manifested as stereotyping erroneously, of an entire nation. When problems mount in society, the specific cultural and historical context involved can fuel the stereotyping of entire nations as people look for the causes of such problems in others, in foreigners. They start to blame (scapegoat) them for job insecurity, problems with healthcare, low wages, the lack of safety nets etc. In a culture of fear, domestic frustrations are transferred to foreign enemies. A crisis is a typical example of when such prejudicial attitudes are created, although stereotypes can also be built to make it easier to process limited information and degrade others in order to magnify one’s own image. This phenomenon is more common when little is known about others or it is hard to learn about them due to being located far away (the distance factor). Such stereotypes impede our ability to objectively assess data/processes, assuming that stereotypes, presenting different picture, are believed to be true. Our readiness and ability to think critically and predict the behaviour of others is thereby weakened. All of these elements are visible in all the perils we analyse here, particularly in the yellow scares. People like to rely on stereotypes that validate their already held opinion more than trying to evaluate each situation on its own, by looking at data. They tend to select information sources that suit their ideological orientation and ignore other sources or contrary opinions. In a way, stereotypes are an instrument of excuses. After defining the role played by fear, we must examine more quantitative data to shed light on what creates such fears. Realism is the leading theory explaining sources of power as it mainly relies on material capabilities and relative economic and military power. Apart from neglecting the role of domestic beliefs, this may be its biggest shortcoming in view of the rising importance of soft power.. According to mainstream realism,7 countries compete with each other as they pursue their national interests in the struggle for power in anarchic international relations. The power of a state depends on what it is actually based on and the ways in which it is exercised. Seeking hegemony is therefore the result because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to acquire power at the expense of rivals. States are concerned with the accumulation of relative power as they will not be content with relative security by relying on other states (see Snyder, 2002). Such offensive realism can thus explain the emerging role of China as it aspires to obtain a more prominent role in international relations. On the other hand, defensive realism can explain the USA as it struggles to retain its current dominance, which is proving more important than increasing its power. To properly understand the rise of China today, it is essential to look beyond realism, to also consider the soft power8 which is growing in importance in a VUCA world. However, the capacity to influence others means possessing resources like population, land, natural resources, economy, armed forces, and political stability (Nye and Welch, 2014). Soft and hard power are not alternatives, but complements. In the words of Melissen, “the wheels of hard power can only function smoothly with the lubricant of soft power” (Ham, 2005). Lacking in soft power, China has started to intensively use soft power to complement its hard power based on six pillars: cultural attractiveness, political values, development model, international institutions, international image, and economic temptation (Li and Worm, 2010). The whole story about attitudes to the leading or aspiring global players is about power and its transition. Power transition theory is in fact a version of the power balance theory, a very popular theory of international relations that interprets the causes of conflict (Haas, 1953; Sheehan, 1996; Waltz, 1979). It stems from the hierarchical nature of international relations in which the most powerful countries define the rules of the game. As rival countries acquire power, the chances of war increase (Hillebrand, 2010: 12).9 The old powers’ resistance to the erosion of their position leads us to the second group of theories, the theory of hegemon. Hegemonic stability theory (THS) argues that an asymmetric system10 is probably more stable; if one country dominates, it is a hegemon. The hegemon dominates the rules of the game and with the help of military dominance creates certain public goods in the form of security and economic stability. The erosion of this role can therefore stifle the world system and throw its stability off balance. The smaller the difference in power between the leading and rival states, the greater the likelihood of conflict (Kugler and Organski, 1989) with the upcoming forces because the incumbent power is unwilling to leave its prime position11; the so-called Thucydides trap12 (Allison, 2017). “But it doesn’t have to be« (ibid. 2017) Allison adds, although Kugler (2006) believes that China’s growing power over the USA is greatly increasing the chances of war in the next few decades. Emmott states “that the USA should not fear falling into a Thucydides trap because the historical analogy of England, Germany and WW2 is dissimilar to East Asia today. Germany overtook Britain in the 1900s, while China will not overtake the US for decades” (Emmott, 2009). According to China’s plans, this could happen upon the 100-year anniversary of their country in 2049. However, China is still far from closing the gap on all sources of power and thus the chances of war are lower. The power transition is not simply a political, geopolitical or economic problem, but a psychological one. The leading nations pride is hurt13 and it therefore attempts to block the emergence of any new power(s). The third group of relevant theories deals with different civilisation models since views are firmly embedded in the culture of the observer. Ethnocentrism is a worldview that regards Western culture and way of thinking as something extraordinary, placing it in the centre of the world14. Other cultures are viewed as different, backward, despotic-undemocratic, sometimes even barbaric or racist. It is assumed that the entire world should be modelled on Western values that are seen as universal, always correct, while others are uncivilised barbarians (see Plummer, 2010: 214). “It is about understanding the ideas and practices of another culture with the criteria of our own” (Giddens, 1997). Eurocentrism has been built on an ethnocentric ideological construct approach, locating Europe in the world’s epicentre. It interprets the history of the world as its own history. One’s identity develops on the basis of difference from others, difference in the degree of rationality; we are rational and others are irrational. The only possible conclusion is – European civilisation is superior. According to Amin, this is the ideology of the modern capitalist world (2009). Mastnak sees in Eurocentrism “a colonialist worldview, an inspiration for the European conquest and subjugation of the world and the justification of that conquest and rule” (Južnič, 2009: 183–184). The recently developed ethno-nationalism, manifested in populism and every country first policies has its roots in such theories. It also gives rise to orientalism as a view of the Middle East and, more broadly, of Eastern civilisations (Said, 1996). The mythology of enemies other than us is attributed to “sub- or inhuman ethnic and racial traits”. It is not about attitudes to individuals, but about a group of people who, as a last resort, have evil purposes attributed to them (conspiracy theory) in the sense of good versus bad. The responsibility for our own problems is shifted over to strangers (the ideology of economic nationalism), often expanding into overt populist-tinged chauvinism/racism and xenophobia. Refugees/migrants are increasingly the scapegoats for the ever worse position of those affected by technical progress and globalization (GLO), together with rising imports from China15. The populist revolt against the enormous upsurge in Chinese exports which, on top of the GLO, is seen as the biggest culprit for the lost jobs and deindustrialisation of the West. Inglehart and Norris contend this revolt is largely based on cultural, not economic factors (see Freund et al. 2017). Trump’s protectionism is also motivated by the incorrect assumption that China is to blame for the large US trade deficit.16 A chronology of fears The Red Scare The very first red scare in the USA came after the Paris Commune of 1871 while the second one followed the October Bolshevik revolution in Russia. It centred on the perceived threat of the American labour movement, anarchist revolution and political radicalism. The Third Red Scare came directly after WW2, fuelled at home by the perception of national or foreign communists infiltrating or subverting American society and, as the external factor, by the Soviet Union’s growing role in the world. A new bogeyman, ‘The Red Menace’, was portrayed as being everywhere. Communists were demonised. The Red Scare reached its peak between 1950 and 1954 during ‘McCarthyism’. The pursuit of allegedly communist infiltrators in American society had begun. Domestic communism was seen an enemy of apocalyptic proportions. When the Soviets developed an atomic bomb, fear levels intensified, just like during the Cuban crisis or when in 1957 the Soviets sent “Lajka” the dog into space on Sputnik 1. American pride was wounded then like it is now, faced with a decline in its global leadership. As a rule, such fears manifest as various conspiracy theories to make them become more tangible and more persuasive from the point of view of their generators. After the transition, Russia’s role in the world has been shrinking. Further, like all autocratic regimes, Russia should eventually transition to a marketdriven democracy (Ikenberry, 2014) meaning that it is less of a concern. Nevertheless, fear of Russia is again on the rise, mainly based on deep distrust and value-based concerns. Putin has spoken of the “offensive mistrust of the West about Russia” (Petrič, 2018: 471). American Challenge; Europe The demolished Europe, wrote J. J. Servain-Schreiber in his bestseller (1967/69), is under threat from the Americans. The USA was pictured as “enslaving” Europe, becoming an economic colony based on massive inflows of American investment funds. He believed that Europe, lagging behind the USA on all fronts (management, technology, research) was in a silent economic war. He spoke of “American attackers” in the form of US multinational companies, about the collapse of Europe. Yet Schreiber did not stop just with describing the situation. He helped revive French nationalism (similar to today’s populist movements). Later, he taught at Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh, 1984–1995) and became chairman of Le Center Mondial in Paris that promoted the development of computer and information technologies. In 1985, he told President Mitterrand he was resigning because the French government had wanted to procure French equipment for France’s schools instead of buying the computers from an American corporation (see Rubner, 1990: 272). Schreiber’s intellectual honesty and consistency may thus be questioned. To conclude, these fears were also overblown. Yellow Peril I The Yellow Peril has seen two waves in the USA. The First Peril was directed against Chinese workers at the end of the 1880s. Rather than addressing the economic aspect of immigration, in 1882 anti-Asian propaganda encouraged the federal government to pass the Chinese Exclusion Act, making the immigration of Chinese labourers to the USA unlawful and preventing them from obtaining citizenship. Although this Act was repealed in 1943, anti-Asian sentiment/propaganda remained strong in the country. Later, following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, it was directed at Japanese-Americans, portrayed in ways very similar to the 19th century Chinese immigrants. Yellow Peril propaganda was based on the supposedly lower intelligence or subhuman qualities of Japanese people (see White, 2019). Yellow Peril II; Japan The second wave of the Yellow Peril came in 1960 during the Japanese miracle (10.5% average GDP growth in 1950–1973). Japan’s share of world GDP had risen from 2–3 percent to 10 percent. The Japanese miracle was largely due to the creative imitation of Western technology and introduction of new production methods (lean production). Schreiber (1980) was fascinated by Japan’s automotive industry and automation, robotisation and computer science. This miracle was initially facilitated by the possibility of directing all its resources for development (Japan was not allowed to spend on the army). Second, it was due to the inventiveness and working habits of the Japanese people and the systematic strategic trade and industrial policy. The Japanese began to buy property in Manhattan and acquired American ‘jewels’ (like Rockefeller Center in Manhattan, Firestone Tire and Rubber, Columbia Pictures or the Pebble Beach Golf Course). It was predicted that Japan might already overtake the USA by GDP pc in 1985. Not surprisingly, Vogel (1979) wrote the book: Japan as Number One. This fear indeed had both economic and cultural roots given that American pride and self-confidence had been dented. The Japanese had taken the lead in sectors previously the cause of American pride (automotive industry). Still, such fears again proved to be overblown since Japan’s yellow miracle was followed by very low growth and then by the lost century. Imitation can obviously be a double-edged sword; those imitated feel threatened, while simultaneously, by wanting to have what the imitated have, the imitators themselves begin to be troubled by doubts and lose their self-respect. The French philosopher Girard says this leads to hostilities and a feeling of being endangered. Yellow Peril III: China’s Contemporary Challenge Today’s yellow peril concerns the big challenge China brings to the whole international system after its spectacular rise in the last 40 years. In less than 30 years, China had become the world’s second-largest economy by 2001. The first signs of the modern fear of China emerged in December 2004, the last month in which The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) remained in force but was set to expire by the end of the year under a World Trade Organization (WTO) decision. Developed countries soon barricaded themselves off from China and the threat of becoming flooded with its textile products. The challenge with China is underpinned by the size of its economy and by it rivalling the USA as the dominant power. China is already the world’s largest economy in population and trade-volume terms. Nominally, in 2017 China’s GDP amounted to 64 percent of US GDP. In 2014, it overtook the USA in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) to become the world’s biggest economy (Bergsten, 2018, 2). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that China will overtake the US (at 2017 market rates) in 2030 (IMF, 2018). Yet, according to the index of economic strength, China still lags 12.3 percent behind the USA. Still, as early as 2030 it may become the leading economic power, holding an 18% share while that of the USA is projected to fall (1973–2030) from 16.3 percent to 10.2 percent (Subramanian, 2011). These economic indicators should be stressed because there is a strong long-term correlation between economic capability, military power and a country’s position in the global power system. “Therefore, the hegemon (either US or China) will be in a weaker position than before /… /. It should be though remembered that, historically, China’s leading role is a natural position, since China lost its leading position by Britain only in the 19th century, and after the WW2, when US has taken over from the latter” (van Bergeijk, 2018: 15). One of the more controversial economic accusations and economic fears underlying the challenge posed by China is that it systematically imitates17 and ‘steals’ intellectual property (IP)18 and forces foreign companies to transfer their technology to Chinese companies. Imitation is partly the result of admiration and resistance to Western ideas following the Century of Humiliation, the “Opium war which marked the beginning of China’s collapse and dismemberment at the hands of foreign powers” (see Davis and Rašković, 2017: 8). A fundamental goal of contemporary Chinese politics is to do all that is needed to ensure this never happens again. It nevertheless seems that this accusation is overblown. Namely, in the latest US-China Business Council Member Survey, just 5 percent of respondents reported having been asked to transfer technology to China, and this concern was ranked 24 out of the top 27 challenges facing foreign companies (Huang and Smith, 2019). At the same time, certain problematic imitation activities (trade, foreign investment, licensing, international research collaboration, reverse engineering) are legitimate and voluntary. Moreover, the situation in the area of IP rights is now changing. Premier Li Keqiang stated that “strengthening IP protection is strategic and vital for strengthening the socialist market economy” (Reuters, 2017). In view of the ambitious plans to transform China from a “large manufacturing country” into a “powerful manufacturing country” by 2025 and a “leading global producer” by 2049 (“Made in China” and plans for the PRC’s 100th anniversary in 2049), it may be expected that China will become a leader in many technology-driven activities. Simultaneously, the country seeks to strengthen the protection of IP not so much due to external pressures but under the internal pressure of its own companies that desire greater protection for their patents. The more domestic firms become innovative, the more they are seeking to protect their IP rights19. China is a global leader in technologies such as e-commerce, artificial intelligence, fintech, high-speed trains, renewable energy, and electric cars. Companies like Alibaba, Didi Chuxing, Huawei and Tencent are operating at the global technology frontier (World Bank, 2019: xvii). The third economic fear relates to the huge rise of Chinese investments, especially their acquisition of technology-leading companies (Godement et al., 2017). This opens the door not only to economic but political influence and creates potential for the Chinese ‘divide and rule’ policy. Public opinion is becoming more hostile (Grant and Barysch, 2008) but oscillating between “China saving Europe” and “China taking over Europe” (Shambaugh, 2013). The world fears the transfer of Chinese management patterns or values wherever their companies make investments. Past experience shows evidence of both implications; strong adaptations to local cultures (particularly in industrial countries) but also the imposition of its own management style and working habits (Africa) or a combination of these two strategies, a kind of Yin-Yang cultural approach treating different countries/firms/people differently. The EU is encountering China’s ever more aggressive policy of influencing more flexible and less critical positions in China (market economy status, democracy). The 17+1 initiative is such a strategy that could create splits within the EU, making some members the ‘fifth column’ of China in the EU. It is thus little wonder that alarm bells have started ringing over China’s ability to translate its economic power into attempts to undermine Europe’s unified policy on China. Apart from hard economic data, soft power factors should also be considered. Here, China’s position is still weak despite all the efforts it has been making in public diplomacy recently. Chinese public diplomacy these days is replacing the previous “charm offensive” strategy (Kurlantzick, 2007: 6) aimed at neutralising the “theory of threats” and improving China’s global reputation (Tai-Ting Liu, Tony, 2019: 77). The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may also be regarded as an instrument of soft power. Today’s paranoia, in the face of a rapidly growing and increasingly ambitious China, is obviously principally rooted in the enormity of the Chinese economy. Second, a fear of its difference, exotics, is entailed; third, of its leading role in the world and, finally, the fear of economic intelligence, of espionage, as a threat to security. “In the name of national security, America is treating Chinese students and scholars as a new ‘yellow peril’, in a witch-hunt worthy of Senator Joseph McCarthy” (The Economist, 2019, 13 July: 52). The fear of the difference is merging with the fear of potential political interference in the economy via the large share of state-controlled firms20. The biggest distinction is therefore that China is a different civilisation, a communist, centralised and authoritarian state. It has different values and religious beliefs. The challenge brought by Chinese is thus different. Three potential scenarios arise. First, that China’s position will start to be eroded if it becomes unable to cope with the accumulated problems of its own rapid growth and the fact it has not anticipated the accompanying problems21, including all the political challenges, the necessary democratisation of the political system, and providing more human rights in the long run22. China will encounter Rodrik’s trilemma (2011) regarding how to accommodate its three pillars: GLO, sovereignty and democracy23. This scenario entails considerable internal instability and negative implications for world stability, clearly not in the interest of any of us. An international implication of such a stagnant scenario might be China adopting a more aggressive foreign policy aimed at maintaining support at home while ratcheting up repression against any signs of dissent at home. A more likely scenario is that China will take on a leading role in many areas, especially the economy, thereby beginning to change the world’s structure in either the direction of Pax Sinica or a multilateral system with China as one of the leading powers (the third scenario) in a world of cooperation and competition among the great powers. The question is whether China wishes to abolish the capitalist world order or to simply form a nonhegemonic capitalist world order in which it will have more opportunities for development. According to Hočevar (2019, 15), it seems more that “China does not undermine the capitalist world order, but rather tries to challenge the US position in the existing capitalist world order in order to form a non-hegemonistic capitalist world order”. He may be right for now, but the situation could change when China achieves a more hegemonistic position. History shows that power corrupts and aspirations can, along the way, be broadened, such as to shape the world so as to better suit its own (ideological) design (albeit the changes will be gradual). Economic success is namely enhancing China’s self-confidence, courage and opportunities to exercise its interests. It appears obvious that the US hegemony will come to an end, thereby jeopardising the stability of the system in line with the theory of hegemonic stability. The erosion of this role could thus endanger the existing global system’s functioning, throwing its stability off balance. Differences and similarities in the above perils Is there a common denominator to these fears, eclipsing popular apocalyptic literature, about dangerous aliens threatening our world, or are they more idiosyncratic? Both are correct; there are similarities and differences. Four of the most obvious similarities are as follows. The first is the fear of the growing economic size of the challengers while the second is the fear of external threats, of dangerous aliens that endanger our white world mostly because they are different and not so much because they are economically or technologically threatening. Economic concerns have gradually turned into more ideological, cultural, religious, civilisational or even racist fears. They appear as mythology regarding an enemy, someone that threatens us because they are different, which is not ours. The third group relates to the second but is ideologically based (red and yellow scare III) and the last one relates to the changing international context. The first type of fear (growing economic power) primarily relates to the American challenge to Europe after WW2, and today’s China threat also manifested in Trump’s America First policy. The Japanese yellow peril in the 1960/1970s was also economically based, but dissimilar in that the Japanese are culturally different. Among the analysed economic challenges, the biggest quantitative difference is the size and geostrategic role/ambition. Japan’s challenge in the 1970s was confined to economic/technological power (Japan’s GDP was 9 times smaller than that of the USA, whereas China’s GDP today is already 70% of US GDP). The specifics of the Chinese challenge these days, compared to the one posed by Japan, is that such economic strength is ever more combined with military and geostrategic ambitions to become the leading country in the region and (more implicitly than explicitly) in the world. The challenge China provides today is quantitatively only comparable to that of the USA when challenging Europe in the aftermath of WW2. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union also competed with the USA chiefly in the ideological, military and space technology fields, but was never a serious global economic or commercial contender24. The challenge posed by China is unlike the American, red scare and Japanese challenge. China’s size is unrivalled by Russia or Japan. The Chinese shock has affected those who were already struggling to keep their jobs for other reasons while in Japan’s case US industry was better prepared (the context factor). It is also unlike them because China’s growth is extremely important for the global economy, whereas the relative consequences for the world brought by all other challengers would be significantly weaker. The challenge of China also has a geopolitical dimension in that it is becoming a military force and, in contrast to Japan, it is not an ally. China is the only military and economic rival of the USA and is hence creating a fundamental shift in the global distribution of power and influence (Geeraerts, 2013: 6). Based on detailed historical analysis, Subramanian notes that China’s dominance is more imminent than usually believed, will be more broadly based (covering wealth, trade, external finance, and currency), and could be as large in magnitude in the next 20 years as that of the UK in the halcyon days of the Empire or of the USA in the aftermath of World War II (2011: 4). Yet, the ‘China challenge’ has some similarities with the red one. They both used to have not only economic but also ideological roots, although the Soviet Union wanted to export socialism and China is expanding more through its economic and less through its ideological power. The second group refers to culturally-based, ideological fears, the threat of those who are exotic, because we do not know or understand them and they are ideologically different. We therefore feel threatened (USSR/Russia and China). In 1993, P. Kennedy stated that “Protectionism, anti-immigrant policies, blocking new technologies, and finding new enemies to replace Cold War foes are common reactions at a time of jolts and jars and smashes in the social life of humanity”, a view that can be applied to the current situation. Fear of this group can also be explained theoretically by the hegemonic stability and power transition theory, and eurocentrism. The third group of differences is political/ideological. While the USA, Japan and Europe share Western democratic values, China is an authoritarian socialist state, just like the Soviet Union was when it challenged the USA. However, China does not export its ideology as much as the Soviet Union did, but is first and foremost pursuing its global economic interests. By doing so, it can also indirectly pursue its ideology by spreading its soft power25 and ‘sharp power’26; for instance, by making the beneficiary states in the BRI financially dependent when they are unable to repay the large loans received for infrastructural projects within this framework (debt trap diplomacy)27. The fourth distinct factor is the changed circumstances in the world after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War and, up until recently, the strengthening of multilateralism, galloping globalisation (and de-globalisation of late), growing interdependencies and digitalisation. This is a special kind oligopolistic multilateralism, a blend of cooperation and competition between the major players that today are highly interconnected within a network of global cooperation. This power transition is occurring in a different environment, suggesting that a new cold war scenario is not very likely. Apart from the differences in all of the mentioned challenges, there are some similarities. Basically, all of the said fears: a. were based on quantitative/size factors, the rapid growth of the economies, their political and military power challenging the current system and the world hegemony, b. proved to be overblown, too dramatic, provoking paranoid panic overreactions. But nothing gets eaten as hot as it gets cooked, c. were based on ideological cultural roots, including racial, even racist prejudices28, on ethnocentrism, generating suspicions leading to eroded trust, d. were often misused for internal political battles (McCarthyism in the USA or today’s populism) and draw attention to the need to make changes in the global system’s structure and functioning and to adapt to such tectonic movements in advance, not after the event, to the transition of power underway in the global system. These fears have also caused a rethinking of certain theoretical postulates about international trade/ relations and development theories generally. This is the positive role of such fears. China is clearly the biggest challenge in the modern world. Yet, fears of a yellow peril are not new, although the forms and contexts are different, confirming Hegel when he said that history repeats itself the first time as a tragedy29 and the second time as a farce30 (Marx’s addition). These phenomena started with a red scare, the fear of the rise of Bolshevism and later the Soviet Union (now Russia) after World War II and European fears of the USA becoming dominant in the period of its post WW2 reconstruction and later the fear of Japan’s spectacular technological rise. The article has described the substantial differences and similarities that exist among the challengers due to their size, political systems, ideological basis, military strength and geopolitical ambitions, and the context. The explanatory power of the different theories varies according to individual challengers; somewhere along the line, the greatest weight was given to the realist school and power transition theory based on economic/quantitative factors as a basis for their power (Japan, USA, China), or ideological/ military factors (in the case of the Soviet Union/Russia), while elsewhere they are again more ethnocentric (Japan, China). This makes a multidisciplinary approach essential because a single discipline is unable to explain such tectonic changes and ensuing reactions. All of the mentioned fears were significantly overblown by linearly extrapolating tendencies into the future, without taking account of the historical context or other factors that hampered such linear forecasts. They were conceptualised within a ‘zero-sum’ game where the rise of one power leads to the decline of another, causing inevitable conflict with the leading one and amounting to a challenge and threat to the traditional Western-led international order. Kupchan also seems right when claiming, »that the ability of great powers to impose their preferences will only decline further in the future.… The twenty-first century will not be America’s, China’s, Asia’s, or anyone else’s. It will belong to no one«. The USA will no longer be the hegemon it once was. The transformed international system should, using Rodrik words, leave greater “policy space” for national policies and sovereignty. If the great powers act wisely, neither Pax China nor Chimerica or G2 will emerge, but a multilaterally governed world in the interest of all, not just a few. This is viable if China follows, as proposed by Colonel Liu Mingfu, the example of the USA after the experience of the UK which quietly left the lead role to the USA after WW2, and not the Soviet Union example which directly clashed with the USA during the Cold War. He advocates a tolerant, long-term strategy, a century marathon31 (see Miller, 2018). In this manner, war can be side-stepped and a new model of great-power relations developed, avoiding confrontation with the USA. It seems the Beijing Consensus is unlikely to substitute the Washington Consensus in the foreseeable future. However, it holds the potential to influence countries’ development strategies. The near future will not be the same as the last century with one country leading. There could be power sharing between China, the USA, Europe/EU32 and Russia (perhaps also India) within the spirit of a ‘collaborative autonomy’ logic. Europe is not militarily strong enough but has an advantage in terms of its soft power. According to B. Emmott (2006), while China is likely to emerge as the most powerful player, it will not be sufficiently powerful to dominate but strong enough to be significant shaper of the world order. He compares China with Britain in the early 19th century when despite being more powerful it was unable to dominate. It remains unclear whether China wants superpower status. It seems that China is aware of the danger of a strategic overstretch (paraphrasing Kennedy, 1987), as an imbalance between its strategic commitments and its economic base, although it is not immune from triumphalism after abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s low-profile approach of making China great again.

#### The New Yellow Peril produces a violent and parasitic social order that inevitably ends in violence. The rampant nationalism spurred by Liang’s shooting of Gurley demonstrates how racial and political crises can be coopted for conservative means

Liu 18 (Wen, Assistant Professor of women’s gender and sexuality studies at the University of Albany, “Complicity and Resistance: Asian American Body Politics in Black Lives Matter,” October 2018, Journal of Asian American Studies, Volume 21, Number 3)

This racial antagonism between Asian and African American communities, which resulted in accumulated transnational geopolitical conflicts, reached a peak in the aforementioned incident of Liang’s shooting and killing of Gurley in November 2014. This incident, occurring during the height of the BLM protests in Ferguson, became a controversy in the movement. The controversy was raised and then became a division between African and Asian Americans but also within Asian American communities because Liang, a young Chinese American man, was the first among all police officers indicted, the others all white, who had abused police powers in the line of duty resulting in the deaths of many unarmed and innocent Black people. It became apparent to Asian Americans that the government was using Liang as a scapegoat to try to alleviate the national racial “crisis” highlighted by BLM activists and their demands to reform and abolish the police system built on the practices and ideology of white supremacy. This targeting of an inexperienced Asian American officer offended many Chinese Americans. Within a few months of the incident, two large-scale rallies and several press conferences were mobilized in support of Liang by Chinese American business leaders and local politicians, who accused the city’s indictment of officer Liang as racist. This seemingly defensive mobilization against Liang’s indictment was quickly appropriated by conservative elites and politicians and turned into an offensive, anti-Black critique of BLM’s racial justice vision. I identified four distinct discursive strategies that the pro-Liang groups adopted to turn BLM’s critique of the state’s racism via police violence into racism against Chinese Americans: racial victimology, ethnic empowerment and deservingness, the American Dream, and anti-Blackness. These discursive strategies allowed the proLiang groups to shift the attention away from BLM’s broader demand for racial justice and toward intergroup Asian-Black conflicts. Racial Victimology The pro-Liang coalition mobilized Chinese immigrant communities not only in New York City and its surrounding suburbs but also transnationally. An online petition for the White House opposing Liang’s indictment started by a Chinese American community member quickly reached almost 120,000 signatures.27 Within a day of the announcement of the court, tens of thousands of dollars were donated to the campaign to withdraw Liang’s indictment from Chinese people of all classes—restaurant workers, beauticians in hair salons, business managers, lawyers, and retired elders, and so on.28 Meanwhile overseas, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) central propaganda newspaper, People’s Daily, not only reported the incident but also condemned the U.S. government as “unjust” and argued that “the US legal system still has a long way to go,”29 implicating that the unequal treatment of Chinese Americans crushed the fantasy of egalitarian multiculturalism in the United States. Due to the wide-scale response and interests in the case, a self-proclaimed “civil rights” organization called Coalition of Asian American for Civil Rights (CAACR) was quickly formed after the incident. The coalition organizers, mostly Chinese American businessmen, saw this as a chance to inject rarely visible Asian American agendas into mainstream politics and strengthen the community’s ties with the police and the state. Thousands of Chinese American protestors gathered on the lawn of Cadman Plaza in Brooklyn, waving American flags and bilingual signs in support of Liang on April 26, 2015. The crowd largely consisted of middle-aged, first-generation Chinese Americans and their young children. Many people wore red clothes as a symbol of Chinese national pride. Although the event was set as a protest against the “unjust treatment” of the state and many were chanting “No Scapegoats!” along with the organizers on the stage, the tone of the event was strangely celebratory. Some families brought picnics and speakers to play Chinese music in the park, as if it was an extension of the Lunar New Year celebration that had happened earlier in the month. Due to the sheer amount of people present in the crowded space, it was difficult to hear the speeches from the politicians and business leaders on the main stage. The political content of the rally was not clear to me in the first place. My conversation with a Chinese woman in her thirties from a New Jersey suburb confirmed at least one segment of ambiguous political motivation of the participants, as she admitted that she wasn’t familiar with the details of the Liang-Gurley case. The reason she had decided to come was because a message in her WeChat group encouraged people to show up to demonstrate “Chinese unity.” The themes of Chinese unity and pride seemed collectively shared among the participants, who expressed a sense of urgency to show up and to “not get looked down on by the Americans,” in other words, the mainstream society that they felt had silenced their political views for too long. The reason that the mobilization was successful and effective should not be attributed to the significance of the Liang-Gurley case alone but be examined in the context of a cumulative organizing effort within Chinese communities. Several precursor events contributed to the turnout at Liang’s rallies. First, in October 2013, on the Jimmy Kimmel Live segment “Kids Table Government Shutdown Show,” ABC aired an episode in which four children were discussing how the United States should solve the problem of its massive national debt to China. One child suggested that the government should build a big wall, and another six-year-old child laughed and said, “kill everyone in China.”30 The remarks infuriated Chinese American communities, a group of whom sent a petition to the White House’s “We the People” online initiative to demand that the U.S. government investigate ABC’s racial hatred.31 It reached a hundred thousand signatures in the three weeks following the show’s airing. Although the White House used the argument of free speech to deflect the demand, a new online network of Chinese Americans was built and carried a sense of political purpose to challenge racism against Chinese communities in the United States and abroad, unaffiliated with the existing nonprofit structure of Asian American network formed after the civil rights movements, galvanizing a new Chinese American collective identity of racial victimhood.32 Second, this insurgent political consciousness of middle-aged Chinese Americans, traditionally thought of as silent in American mainstream politics, was mobilized due to their desire to preserve their children’s educational privileges in higher education, as many institutions now do not consider Asian American a protected racial category. A coalition of Asian American groups filed suits against Harvard and several other Ivy League universities in 2015 and 2016 regarding their racial quotas in admission processes.33 While progressive affirmative action activists have been adapting the category of Asian American to argue that not all Asian Americans fit into the high-achieving stereotype, especially when Pacific Islanders and Southeast Asian Americans are considered, the complaints around higher education admission from Chinese American communities in recent years are primarily based on the ideology of meritocracy regardless of one’s race. This demand is about eliminating the Asian racial category as a protected class that is no longer needed. A color-blind racial rhetoric packaged in discourses of rights and justice has emerged in conservative Chinese American communities. These two political mobilizations together became the background driving forces for a solidified Chinese American subjectivity in the Liang Gurley case, built upon a form of racial victimology. The Chinese protestors, particularly the leadership, called out the state’s scapegoating tactic against Liang and labeled the incident “racial discrimination,” “unfair treatment,” and “selective treatment,” as many white officers have killed innocent people and have not been charged with manslaughter. Signs depicting Martin Luther King and speeches about the killing of Vincent Chin in the 1980s were highlighted in the rallies in March and April 2015, each drawing thousands of Chinese American participants. Ethnic Empowerment and Deservingness Whereas the deaths of Gurley and many other Black victims of police violence were not fairly addressed by the state or mainstream media, many Chinese publications in the United States portrayed the Chinese American mobilization in a unilateral celebratory tone. World Journal and Sing Tao Daily called the pro-Liang movement, which started in New York and spread across major U.S. cities, a “historical” phenomenon and the “largest” Chinese American gathering in the United States, showing an “unprecedented unity” and “solidarity” as well as a “mature and rational” image of the community.34 The Asian American rhetoric from the civil rights movement was largely appropriated to manufacture a united front of the Chinese American body politic as racial victim and, again, a legible racial minority deserving of institutional access and apology. This celebratory narrative of the newly emerged Chinese American “political unity” quickly became a political opportunity for Chinese elites to form a “rainbow coalition” with local Republican politicians, Asian and white, seizing the moment to condemn the current Democratic government and form stronger ties with the city’s police department. For instance, Joseph Concannon, a white retired NYPD captain, failed Senate and city council candidate, and president of the Tea Party–aligned Queens Village Republican Club, was a major force behind the pro-Liang rallies. Concannon, along with other Chinese American Republicans including Phil Grim and Doug Lee as well as qiaoling (僑領), overseas Chinese business leaders, worked together to push for their antipolice reform agendas as means to not only undermine the government of the more liberal-leaning mayor Bill de Blasio but also unite Asian American voters for the upcoming local elections, as voter registration forms passed through the rally crowd. In the March 9, 2015, “Support Your Local Police” rally to protest the indictment of Liang, Concannon implicitly condemned BLM activists as “racial arsonists” and “professional agitators” who were “turned loose” under de Blasio’s leadership.35 He and other Republican politicians addressed the Chinese American community as the “natural ally” for the pro-police and conservative agendas. A right-wing alliance developed between conservative Chinese and white Americans, who share a deep investment in preserving class privileges and status, in the name of “racial justice.” Far from being cross-racial solidarity, this alliance is white assimilation in disguise. Although securing Asian American voter blocks seemed to be the rainbow coalition’s primary motive in participating in the pro-Liang rally, for many of the Chinese American participants, it was a rare opportunity to express pride in their long-overlooked ethnic and national identity. This intensified sentiment of Chinese nationalism became salient to me in the rally on April 26. Whereas the coalition leadership was drawing from a more multicultural, pan-Asian discourse to put forth their demands to drop Liang’s charges, the conversations I had with the participants emphasized that Chinese people should stand up for themselves and not to get “harassed” or “put down by the Americans” anymore—meaning not only the white Americans who occupy a superior position in society but also other racial minorities, particular Blacks, whose demands seem to be taken more seriously by the state. The Liang incident becomes another classic example of how Asian Americanness is lifted up to perpetuate model minority success in order to deny the institutional access of other marginalized racial subjects such as in the affirmative action debate. It is ironic that the coalition leadership monopolized the representation of “Asian Americans” as a way to reappropriate the current racial crisis for ethnic-nationalist concerns, as the coalition was composed of only Chinese American and white leaders. The discourse of Asian racial victimology was mostly present in the official rhetoric of the Chinese American leaders, but to the participants, especially for the first-generation immigrants, it was more of an issue about Chineseness. Their urgency to stand up and join the rally was to express political power as a people to the American public after decades of being silenced as a racialized population. The American Dream The discourses of the American Dream were everywhere in the pro-Liang rallies. Chinese American families waved American flags while marching across the Brooklyn Bridge on April 26, 2015. The American anthem played before the speeches. Interestingly, the participants, who were largely native Chinese speakers, seemed uninterested in the American anthem, and hardly anyone sang along. Most of the participants, Chinese families with young children, gathered in small groups to take pictures with the American flags given to them by the coalition leaders. Any pedestrian who just happened to walk by that day would have had difficulty recognizing this gathering as a “political protest,” as many participants treated the event more like a social celebration. Some participants were waving heart-shaped signs with the Chinese letter “love” (愛) in red along with the American flags. A thick, impenetrable, and totalizing force of Chinese nationalism was forged during the event. The collective political narrative of Chinese ethnic empowerment superseded the more nuanced ways the participants understood the Liang-Gurley incident. At one point the redness of the American flags and the redness from the participants’ signs, clothes, and banners, which symbolized Chinese unity, merged in the scene. It became clearer and clearer to me, as I marched “ethnographically” with the crowd, that the American Dream was aligned with an equally powerful, affective Chinese Dream and a neoliberal transnational dream of class advancement that requires exclusion and stratification of the classed and racial Other. As a queer Taiwanese American observer in the march, my otherness was indeed quite apparent. Despite being ethnically Han, my queerness and nonconforming gender expressions drastically singled me out from the crowd of middle-aged parents and their young children. When I spoke to the march participants, my Taiwanese Mandarin accent was also quite distinct from that of the Chinese mainlanders. I felt as though I was a “race traitor” and consciously distanced myself from the crowd so that they would not recognize my ulterior emotions. At the same time, I recognized the very flexible capacity of my Asian Americanness that blended in the collective expression of Chinese American body politic to the non-Chinese spectators, yet my queerness continued to signify a stance of dissidence and protest—an opposition to the American and the Chinese ideal. However, without the presence of other dissidents, my race and ethnicity were quickly absorbed and territorialized by the collective body politic in the event—the ambiguous yet powerful signs of Chineseness, masking in total consensus by the bodies, the chants, the redness everywhere on participants’ signs, banners, and clothes. The collective political narrative of Chinese ethnic empowerment supersedes the more nuanced ways the participants understood the Liang-Gurley incident. The U.S. flag in the event symbolized not only allegiance to the state but an aspiration to become successful as Chinese people in the United States. During my fieldwork on the bridge, another middle-aged Chinese woman told me that she had brought her son to the rally because she wanted him to “learn democracy” in order to be “successful in this country.” As much of the Chinese press that covered the pro-Liang mobilization as a historical event has shown Chinese solidarity and Chinese people’s capacity to participate in civic actions in a “mature and rational” manner,36 the subjectivity that emerged in these events was less about a demonstration of American patriotism and more about Chinese modernity and desire for a new nation as a people. As the previous Asian American assimilationist politics in the post–civil rights period emphasized American national and cultural identity, that is, a liberal racial ideology of national belonging, the pro-Liang coalition expressed a qualitatively different kind of national belonging grounded in a moral and cultural ethic of economic advancement and civic respectability, as well as in a dream of Chinese modernity. Aihwa Ong has defined neoliberalism as a technology of governance that rearticulates the social criteria for citizenship for the purpose of optimizing the effects of the market and demoralizing economic activities.37 Citizenship is thus no longer strictly attached to national identification but defined by economic productivity. In short, the participants’ desire for U.S. nationalism is less about being seen as “Americans” and more about a longing for continual economic prosperity and political opportunities for their communities and their next generations. Similarly, the discourse around Liang’s “unfair” indictment focused not on his unequal treatment as an “American” but on how the promise of model minority advancement was temporarily shattered by a state-inflicted racial crisis.

#### This New Yellow Peril, however, reveals itself in two instances of monopolization.

#### First, Sinophobia has monopolized contemporary discourses of China by means of White Men’s monopoly over discussion within this discourse.

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The 2020 COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan triggered a wave of discrimination, abuse and violence towards ESEA (East and Southeast Asian) communities in the West, with thousands of hate crimes being reported a week: from old ladies in New York being set on fire, to a Singaporean man being viciously assaulted in broad daylight on Oxford Street. Popular Asian-American media outlet NextShark has practically become a rolling newsreel for attacks like this, and there is no doubt that our communities are currently violently under attack. This has only been exacerbated by former US President Donald Trump's continued insistence on referring to COVID-19 as 'The Chinese Virus', or even 'Kung-Flu', emboldening racists across the world to enact public hatred towards people of ESEA descent. This is, of course, nothing new. Racism against ESEAs has long been considered a joke or non-existent, which has led to the widespread normalization of racism towards our communities. From personal experience, growing up I was casually called a chink, subject to jokes about penis size, eating dogs, being a Communist (in the case of the more geopolitically aware white kids), being good at maths, not being good at maths... you know, the usual. I'm sure most ESEAs who grew up in the UK or US can relate to these experiences. However, this insidious level of normalized racism is precisely why racists have felt emboldened enough to attack us in broad daylight: they know they will face little in the way of repercussions, since ESEA communities have historically been considered meek, subservient and compliant, a stereotype we often live up to, leading to a lack of activism and advocacy within our own communities, let alone society at large. Since COVID, ESEA communities across the diaspora have begun speaking up en masse, and progress has been made. In the UK, BESEA individuals like Viv Yau, Daniel York Loh and MP Sarah Owen, as well as organisations like besea.n (who I believe coined the term 'ESEA', a term I hope goes down in history as the UK's first major contribution to global Asian diaspora discourse) and End The Virus of Racism, have made enormous strides in combating racism against our community, with the very first parliamentary debate on systemic anti-ESEA racism, discussing news articles relating to COVID-19 disproportionately featuring people of ESEA descent, being held thanks to their efforts. However, there is one peculiar blind spot in anti-ESEA racism discourse, especially given the COVID-related nature of the racism currently facing our community: the glaring avoidance of the word Sinophobia. Sinophobia, or Anti-Chinese sentiment, is defined as hatred or fear against China, its people, its diaspora, and culture. The fact that I even have to define this word is symptomatic of why it's become such an insidious problem in the first place. Sinophobia is everywhere. It is undeniable that the actions of the CCP have earned it a few friends on the global stage, and people are understandably worried about its encroaching authoritarianism and apparent lack of concern for human rights. It is also undeniable that the CCP and China are demonised by Western media to an absurd degree, with editorials, news articles, videos and more, fixating on almost every single thing China does, being churned out by the hour. To use just one example - British puppet show Spitting Image recently made an excruciatingly cringe-worthy sketch parodying Chinese premier Xi Jinping. The sketch features Xi performing an asinine hip-hop parody called 'the Jinping shuffle' on his TikTok account, lampooning mainstream discourse over TikTok datamining, which I presume the writers felt was the absolute height of cutting-edge social commentary. To call this shitty little ditty ‘satire’ would be an overstatement; not only does it manage to be as painfully, offensively unfunny as the majority of Spitting Image non sequitur-based 'humour', but its depiction of Xi - complete with a mock Chinese accent and a pangolin puppet running around - is troublingly racist. Of course, the show's target audience clearly doesn’t feel this way. The comment section is almost entirely populated with people calling them brave for daring to make fun of the Chinese premier: 'Forget satirising Trump or Biden - THIS takes balls.' 'Well, you can't say Spitting Image doesn't have any balls. It was nice knowing you guys.' One person in the comments even went as far as to say this video made them feel 'proud to be [British]'. Ironic, given that it made me want to revoke my citizenship. 2 - uo8lQbR.png Either way, the comments on that video are telling. It takes an impressive amount of mass cognitive dissonance, social engineering, propaganda and media brainwashing to convince millions of people across the West that you cannot say or do anything that criticises the Chinese government... by constantly pumping out media that criticises the Chinese government. In the grand scheme of things, something tells me that between governing a nation of 1.4 billion people and navigating increasingly fraught international relations, the CCP may have bigger fish to fry than an obscure British puppet show with about as much satirical edge as Balamory. Whether or not the Chinese government deserves this criticism is another question entirely, but I cannot think of another nation in recent history that receives such aggressively frequent, biased and one-sided coverage as China. Many will respond to the above with 'I don't hate the Chinese people, just the government!', a platitude containing about as much self-awareness as classics like 'I'm not racist, I have Black friends', or perhaps more fittingly, 'I'm not racist, I have an Asian wife!' When anti-China reporting and discourse is mired in racist language deliberately manufactured to conjure up Orientalist Yellow Peril tropes ('How sickening that the dragon is roaring back' in the Daily Mail and 'China is the real sick man of Asia' in the Wall Street Journal, to name just two examples), or conflated with nebulous reports of 'Chinese netizens' (i.e. a few cherry-picked comments on Weibo) voicing reactionary beliefs, it becomes far more difficult to believe that the media is just concerned with criticising China's government. This isn't helped by the fact that the majority of English-language information about China doesn't even come from Chinese people. White men hold a terrifying monopoly over both mainstream English-language China journalism and academic discourse (just look at who wrote the last two articles I linked) with prominent, influential figures like Foreign Policy Deputy Editor James Palmer free to peddle thinly veiled xenophobia and open disdain for China and its culture under the guise of academic language and cultural expertise. When mediocre white men visit China for a month or two and are subsequently granted the clout and legitimacy to publish books that look like this and read like this, it becomes clear that there might just be a teensy-weensy bit of a racism problem when it comes to English-language China discourse. It becomes particularly ugly on the rare occasion when public figures are called out for Sinophobia, as these 'China Watchers' bend over backwards to defend each other. Recently, US Senator Marsha Blackburn tweeted that 'China has a 5,000 year history of cheating and stealing. Some things will never change...' in a tweet that anyone would consider horrifying, especially coming from a well-known politician. China Daily commentator Chen Weihua shot back, simply calling her a 'bitch', later clarifying his position that she is, in fact, a 'lifetime bitch', which drew the predictably hand-wringing ire of white liberals everywhere, far more concerned with Chen's usage of profanity than Blackburn insulting the culture, history and diaspora of billions across the world. 7+-+YwhxtIu.jpg Like clockwork, figures such as self-professed 'China Historian' James Millward came out of the woodwork to defend her, making the wildly delusional claim that rather than just being racist, Blackburn's tweet was in fact 'adopting the 5000 years of history trope to criticize the PRC', with Millward proceeding to snidely weaponize stereotypes about Chinese people with his remark that 'Chen Weihua's Twitter Team is not English-savvy enough to know what is too much even on Twitter'. Millward is undeniably giving Blackburn too much credit, and this tweet is enough of a reach that I wonder whether Millward would be better suited as a yoga instructor, but this exchange is nonetheless highly representative of how China is talked about in the English language. When the Anglophone narrative around China is almost entirely dominated by a self-congratulatory circle-jerk of white men who are given free rein to say almost anything they want with impunity, and only held accountable for their brazen prejudice by people with comparatively tiny platforms (like me!! hi x), it's little wonder that open Sinophobia has become such a virulent issue. 6 - cvhJZ99.png The woke consensus on China hasn't been established yet, which means that most white liberal 'progressives' will fall back into old habits when talking about China, those habits of course being Orientalism, xenophobia and racism. The fact that we have seen such a huge rise in hate crimes towards ESEA people as a result of COVID is only proof that the media's extensive Sinophobia campaign is working - after all, if people really only 'hate the Chinese government, not the people', this would not be happening at all. When discussing the recent hate crimes, Minister for Safeguarding Victoria Atkins literally used the exact words 'racist abuse on the basis of perceived Chinese ethnicity'. Japanese musician Tadataka Unno was recently attacked by a gang of youths in New York who thought he was Chinese. Trump has been widely criticised for his repeated usage of the phrase 'China Virus' feeding into anti-Asian racism. Chinese people have been referred to as 'evil bastards' by the very people running our country in House of Commons debates. Do I need to go on? In his excellent article 'The Politics of Being Chinese' for besea.n, Vy-liam Ng has become one of the few BESEA writers to directly engage with Sinophobia itself, listing many examples of how China and Chinese identity are viewed as 2020's biggest 'political bogeyman'. He lists many of the ways China has been demonised by the media in just this year alone, and it's clear that this coverage encompasses far more than just the CCP's actions - these are direct, brazen attacks on Chinese people being pumped out by the institutions most people rely on as sources of information. As he eloquently puts it, 'there’s no pause button as the world creates these narratives with or without us'. At this point it isn't just people of Chinese descent who are being affected: the constant, violent and indiscriminate propagandisation of Chinese identity affects East and Southeast Asians everywhere. Sinophobia is rampant, systemic, insidious, constant and all-encompassing, and it is abundantly clear that the recent wave of Coronaracism towards East and Southeast Asian communities stems largely from Sinophobia - so why do we keep skirting around using the word? Why are we so afraid of calling a spade a spade? Where does this habitual aversion stem from?

#### Second, the topic process itself has resulted in Sinophobic arguments monopolizing negative ground. China has been a major part of each college resolution for the past three years, but people still can’t pronounce President Xi. Those are the same people who are the first to dock speaker points from Asian debaters for vocal inflections, tonal shifts, and accents that dance past white ears. Furthermore, every core neg argument the past four years outlined in topic papers have included iterations of Chinese deterrence that demonstrate a consistent and desired effort to make Sinophobia a stable and predictable research item.

#### As a communicative activity, debate must be held accountable for implicit, and asymmetric rhetorical protocols that maintain orientalist logics that predetermine what conversations are noted as valuable. Intervening at the level of debate is important to correct for baked-in bias. Voting affirmative rejects Sinophobia’s monopolization on contemporary discourse about China [in debate].

Roche 20 (Gerald Roche, Anthropologist and Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Politics, Media, and Philosophy at La Trobe University, “The Epidemiology of Sinophobia,” January-April 2020, <https://madeinchinajournal.com/2020/02/17/the-epidemiology-of-sinophobia/>)

Since the outbreak of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), numerous reports have described a rise in Sinophobia and anti-Asian racism around the world, with occurrences being reported in Australia (Young 2020), France (BBC 2020), Canada (Miller 2020), and many other countries (Rich 2020). This racism started online. Commentators zoomed in on single incidents—like a video of a Chinese influencer eating a bat in Palau, Micronesia, a few years ago—and generalised them to moralised population traits and visions of cosmic retribution. This logic suggested that the virus was caused by disgusting eating habits and poor hygiene, and that people making these ‘lifestyle choices’ deserved to become sick, suffer, and die. How could so many people, unable to find Wuhan on a map and completely unqualified to make any claims about the origin and spread of viruses, feel so confident in making these judgements? In a 1985 article subtitled ‘Towards an Epidemiology of Representations’, the anthropologist Dan Sperber provides us with a way of better understanding this phenomenon. Sperber asks why some ideas circulate, and stick, better than others. His answer, in part, is that this happens because they are evocative. They resonate with, and bring to mind, other representations we are already familiar with. So, when the images of bat-eating circulated online, they evoked pre-existing representations of Chinese people, and Asians in general. This enabled commentators to feel confident in claiming to understand the etiology of the virus and, in doing so, dismiss the suffering of the affected people while even suggesting they actually deserved it. We might call the sum-total of these representations, which demote Asian lives to a plane of insignificance, ‘white supremacy’. — We need to understand this broader context of white supremacy, and the way it has produced hostile indifference to people trapped in the virus outbreak, to appreciate why the reaction of some ‘China watchers’ (journalists, academics, and others), has been so problematic. In response to the rising incidences of anti-Asian racism, these commentators have attempted to downplay or dismiss the significance of this phenomenon. Some have claimed that racism is not ‘the real issue,’ or have suggested that choosing to analyse and discuss Sinophobia is intellectually lazy. Others have claimed that denunciations of Sinophobia are only valid if they also denounce the harms of the Chinese state, such as the Xinjiang concentration camps. None of these people deny the existence of Sinophobia, but they do dismiss its significance. We can therefore label their claims ‘implicatory denialism’, a term introduced by Stanley Cohen in the book States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering (2013). Implicatory denialism, he states, does not involve the denial of facts, but ‘[w]hat are denied or minimized are the psychological, political, or moral implications that conventionally follow’ (Cohen 2013: 8). Understanding why this sort of denialism is a problem does not require us to understand the motivations, intentions, or rationalisations of people who engage in implicatory denialism. Racism is structural, and so are its impacts. It does not matter what people intend, it matters what impact they have. So, we need to ask who this denialism harms and helps, and how. — To begin with, downplaying racism helps racists. In an atmosphere of pervasive white supremacy, racists love seeing people in positions of authority say that racism is not important. These statements act as a form of dog-whistle politics. Racists are emboldened by authority figures suggesting that people talk about race too much. And as the philosopher Jennifer Saul (2018) points out, these dog-whistle effects can occur whether it is the speaker’s intention or not. In addition to empowering racists and contributing to an atmosphere of white supremacy, denialism impacts people who are targeted by Sinophobia. Responding to claims of racism with implicatory denialism sends a clear message that certain people’s lived experiences are not important. ‘Yes, you are suffering, but let’s focus on the REAL issue.’ Some people seem to understand that they are sending this message when they engage in implicatory denialism. To avoid the interpretation that they are wilfully compounding someone’s suffering, they may package their statements in formulations such as ‘I don’t mean to downplay anyone’s suffering but…’ Once again, Jennifer Saul (2019) provides us with a useful term to describe this pragmatic strategy: she calls it a ‘fig leaf’, capturing the way that it acts as woefully insufficient means of concealment. — We can further think about how statements of implicatory denialism harm targets of Sinophobia by comparing them to slurs, as described by Jane Hill in her book The Everyday Language of White Racism (2008). For both slurs and implicatory denialism, the impact of the speech acts comes from their historicity, not from speakers’ intentions. They evoke both a collective history of subordination and individual experiences of lived discrimination. Like slurs, acts of denialism evoke a history. In this case, it is a history of other denials, of the sort used to uphold ‘colourblind racism’, which is the idea that racism is something that was overcome decades ago and has since ceased to exist as a meaningful social force. Eduardo Bonillo-Silva, in his book Racism Without Racists (2018), provides a vivid description of the rhetorical contortions that are needed to maintain this view. At the centre of these rhetorical manoeuvres is denial; denying the existence or significance of racism is central to maintaining it. Therefore, reacting to accounts of Sinophobia with implicatory denialism not only negates the reality of racialised suffering, but also makes it clear that the commentator will allow that suffering to continue, by stifling anti-racist speech. This empowers racists, upholds white supremacy, and compounds the suffering of people facing Sinophobia. — We should do everything we can to stop the spread of coronavirus and to help alleviate the suffering of people who have contracted it. But we need to realise that for most of us, our capacity to do either thing will be limited. What we can do is intervene in the spread of Sinophobia and anti-Asian racism where we are, and in the contexts where our speech acts are heard and interpreted, and help alleviate the suffering of those around us.

#### You should prioritize the retooling of rhetoric in debate – the aff illuminates and intervenes within the embedded asymmetric protocols and relations of this activity which create a counter-force to Anti-Asian violence

Mao and Young 08 (Luming Department Chair and Professor of English and Asian/Asian American Sudies at Miami University, Morris Professor of English and Affiliate of Asian American Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, *Doing Asian American Rhetoric, Chapter: Performing Asian American Rhetoric into the American Imaginary,* 1-1-2008, pg. 1-6)

It must be noted that work by writers and scholars such as Maxine Hong Kingston, Lisa Lowe, Kent Ono, and John Sloop has certainly drawn our attention to the importance of language use within the Asian American context and to the need to invent a “new American language” to represent Asian Americans and to create the literature of a new culture. For Kingston, this new American language “not only grants her characters full linguistic freedom to attempt a higher level of linguistic, racial and cultural assimilation into which Chinese immigrants’ distinctive language forms and cultural traditions are incorporated, but also begins an ideological debate on the linguistic rights and status of Chinese Americans” (Li 2004, 274). This new American language can also assist Asian Americans in their efforts to challenge Standard American English as the only language of knowledge and truth and to repudiate a cultural politics that “relies on the construction of sameness and the exclusion of differences” (Lowe 1991, 28). For Ono and Sloop (2002), this new American language can be located in both civic and vernacular discourses, both of which challenge existing social paradigms and hold promise for substantive social transformations. On the other hand, we have seen few systematic studies that focus on how Asian Americans use language to perform discursive acts and on how they develop persuasive and other rhetorical strategies to create knowledge and to effect social, political, and cultural transformations. Nor have we seen any concentrated efforts directed toward illuminating those conflicting, ambivalent moments that are central to Asian American discursive experiences. In short, there is not much work done on the making of Asian American rhetoric. We define Asian American rhetoric as the systematic, effective use and development by Asian Americans of symbolic resources, including this new American language, in social, cultural, and political contexts. Because these contexts are regularly imbued with highly asymmetrical relations of power, such rhetoric creates a space for Asian Americans where they can resist social and economic injustice and reassert their discursive agency and authority in the dominant culture. In this sense, Asian American rhetoric is intimately tied to, and indeed constituted by, particularizing speech settings, specific communicative purposes, and situated discursive acts. Its uptake and its performative force bring about material and symbolic consequences that in turn destabilize the balance of power and privilege that exists between the majority and minority cultures We credit the emergence of Asian American rhetoric to a number of factors that have been converging in the recent past. First, Asian American rhetoric has both been mobilized by, and directly participates in, an ongoing dialogue that aims to reexamine and reconceptualize rhetoric’s purposes and functions beyond the paradigm of western rhetoric. Such a dialogue not only problematizes the Rhetorical Tradition and its canonical ways of representation, but also makes it possible for Asian American rhetoric, or any other ethnic rhetoric, for that matter, to find its voice and to secure its uptake. As a minority discourse that has long been ignored, marginalized, and/or excluded, Asian American rhetoric becomes an integral, but no less distinctive, part of this complicated and dynamic American narrative. Second, with the publication of such works as Robert Oliver’s Communication and Culture in Ancient India and China (1971) and Geneva Smitherman’s Talkin and Testifyin: The Language of Black America (1977), we came to realize that rhetoric—the systematic and effective use of symbolic resources—was not an Anglo-American phenomenon only, and that the use and study of rhetoric existed in other communities and in other regions around the world. We also began to experience and consciously perform discursive acts whose rhetorical features and significances had hitherto gone unnoticed or unnamed. The emergence of Asian American rhetoric speaks to this desire to give voice to the voiceless and to accord long-overdue legitimacy to those ways of speaking that have long been the stuff that Asian Americans are made of. It further challenges the binary discourse that regularly views all other non-western rhetorics as the very antitheses to western rhetoric and as the “unruly borderlands” in want of exploration, cultivation, and conversion. Third, thanks to the interpretative turn that the field of rhetoric and composition has now embraced, rhetoric is seen as more than just the art of discovering the available means of persuasion. Rather, it is part of the knowledge-making process that is situated in every specific occasion of language use and that is always socially and politically constructed. Such an understanding of rhetoric draws our much-needed attention to the temporal-spatial nature of language use and to its material and symbolic consequences. Asian American rhetoric serves as a compelling example of how Asian Americans have been using language to bring about changes that affect the attitudes, beliefs, and actions of their intended audience as well as their very own. It also presents students, teachers, and scholars with new ways to approach rhetoric and to engage specific rhetorical situations and their formal features such as purpose, audience, and context. While we very much want to claim that Asian American rhetoric commands a sense of unity or collective identity for its users, we want to note that such rhetoric cannot help but embody internal differences, ambivalences, and even contradictions as each and every specific communicative situation—where Asian American rhetoric is invoked, deployed, or developed—is informed and inflected by diverse contexts, by different relations of asymmetry, and by, most simply put, heterogeneous voices. As a minority discourse, Asian American rhetoric reflects and responds to existing social and cultural conditions and practices while gathering and disseminating the illocutionary force of past practices. Or in the words of James Paul Gee, “Words have histories. They have been in other people’s mouths and on other people’s pens. They have circulated other Discourses and within other institutions. They have been part of specific historical events and episodes. Words bring with them as potential situated meanings all the situated meanings they have picked up in history and in other settings and Discourses” (2005, 54; emphasis in the original). However, as a performative, Asian American rhetoric also actively engages and impacts such conditions and practices. That is to say, as it reflects and responds to these conditions and practices, Asian American rhetoric creates its own illocutionary force, thus challenging or turning against “this constitutive historicity of force” (Butler 1993, 227). To the extent it does, Asian American rhetoric becomes a rhetoric of becoming: it is a rhetoric that participates in this generative process, yielding an identity that is Asian American and producing a transformative effect that is always occasioned by use.